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Pseudonym: Vandeborn, Hobart

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JMWAVE officer Grayston Lynch, retired from the U.S. Army, and became active in the Bay of Pigs, and infiltration/exfiltration operations afterwards with Rip Robertson.
An April 1963, dispatch on the AMTRUNK Operation stated that Hobert J. Vandeborn was one of the two case officers (Irving N. Peggins was the other).

A December, 1963, report on a SW message noted that Vandeborn was part of the JMWAVE/FI branch.

A dispatch in August 1964, listed Hobart J.Vandeborn as being one of the CIA staff employees known to AMICE-27 (Dr. Nestor Moreno) and Jorge Volsky. Vandeborn was known as "Tom Mesard" to AMICE-27.

Grayston Lynch, Decision for Disaster (Potomac Books, 2000)

"There were two Americans in Cochinos Bay (the Bay of Pigs) that night (in April 1961), whose mission was to act as American representatives to the 2506 Assault Brigade and as insurance against any mishap that might endanger the effort. Those two agents were William 'Rip' Robertson, a tall, rugged Texan who was to become a legend in the clandestine services, and me."

104-10224-10000: LYNCH, GRAYSON L., OP.

5/12/61 request for approval from CA/PMG (note: Covert Action/Paramilitary Group) to Security Support Division/Office of Security: Grayston Leroy Lynch listed as a member of "Project ZRJEWEL". His specific area of use: "To serve as a paramilitary specialist in any area that is needed." Full details of use: "To provide senior paramilitary support for Agency activity under Project ZRJEWEL." (p. 338): Lynch had been in the Army from 1938-1960, then joined CIA. (p. 318) He had served in Bay of Pigs as a contract agent, this new contract would make him a career agent. (pp. 341-342) Memo to Chief, WH/4 (Cuba) from Chief, CA/PMG: Rip Robertson and Grayston Lynch were working together after June 1961 in Project ZRJEWEL. "Under the terms of Project ZRJEWEL, CA/C/PMG is responsible initially for their selection and recruitment, and subsequently for their training and developmental assignments until they are transferred to an existing operational project under jurisdiction of an operating division...it is suggested that WH Division assume...(administrative) responsibilities for both Robertson and Lynch as of 1 June 1961." Chief, WH/4 also asked to protect the "deniable status" of Robertson and Lynch. (Note how p. 341 initially states "PRJEWEL", and p. 308 is identical letter except for typeface - "ZRJEWEL" - significance is that this letter was typed twice - why?)

104-10224-10000: LYNCH, GRAYSON L., OP.

1/16/62 follow-up letter from Chief, CA/PMG to Chief, WH/4 - Robertson and Lynch working together; p. 272: In April 1963, one of the two men was transferred from the AMTABBY commando group to the AMLILAC commando group, while the other man remained with AMTABBY. (page 268). 4/30/63 appointed REDACTED as Chief of the AMLILAC team. Based on the file, it may be Lynch himself. (p. 291) Lynch was TFW in 1962. (p. 288) 9/62, Bill Harvey approved premium pay. (p. 274) In 1963, he was with SAS. (p. 294) 4/19/62 clarification sought of three employees assigned to JMDUSK. (p. 274) 11/26/63, Stanley Zamka/David Morales signs fitness report for REDACTED (probably Lynch), who has headed a commando team from 5/1/63-9/30/63. (p. 339) Lynch has an IQ of 130, team commander and combat experience.

Ted Shackley, Spymaster (Potomac Books, Inc., Dulles, VA) 2005, pp. 55-56

"(In early 1962) it was decided to review what sabotage operations were being considered for implementation. This revealed that the team of Rip Robertson, Grayston Lynch and Mickey Kappes had been working for months planning an operation against the Matahambre copper mine complex in Pinar del Rio province, an important export earner and thus valuable to Castro...we completed the planning for the operation, got policy approval from the Special Group (Augmented), and launched it. The team got into the Matahambre complex as planned...we learned later that Cuban authorities had found the explosives (and) disarmed them...our Matahambre failure was not well received by Bobby Kennedy. His caustic tongue worked at full speed to let all and sundry know we were the new Keystone Kops. On October 20 the team was back at Matahambre. This time they were detected by Cuban security forces. A short firefight followed. Of the eight men on the team, six were captured. Castro broadcast his triumph over Havana radio. Heartburn was suffered in Washington, and of course the displeasure was conveyed to us in Miami with a series of biting and unflattering remarks."


3/31/63: "The AMTRUNK team, consisting of AMICE-27, AMICE-14, AMTRUNK-2 and AMTRUNK-3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. Parmers, KUROAR instructor from Headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN."


04/05/63, Dispatch from COS, JMWAVE to Chief, Special Affairs Staff: Page 3: 03/31/63: Project AMTRUNK Operation Review: I. Status Report on Training and Processing, 4-31 March: "The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. Palmers, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. Peggins and Hobart J. Vandeborn. Parmers remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included secruity, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communications, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either Peggins or Vandeborn visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majoirty of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, working out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on a informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing..."


12/09/63, CIA document from AMWARM-1: "To: Hobart J. Vandeborn (Field Units Use Pseudo). Division or Branch: WAVE/FI. Report on the Development of SW Message #45 from AMWARM-1 (Agent Crypto). Mailed from (REDACTION) to Miami, Fla. Date Letter: 1 Dec. Postmark: 4 Dec. Rec'd Lab: 9 Dec. 1. It is requested that the Case Officer examine the visible correspondence for content and (unintelligible), in order to assess its effectiveness as a cover (unintelligible) the SW message. 2. Results of the Technical Examination: a. Did the envelope appear to have been opened in transit? No. b. Was any evidence of the SW visible prior to development? Yes, light typing impression. 3. Technical Comments: One page typed SW on back of typed open letter...Submitted by: Michael E. Capolillo (Field Units Sign in Pseudo)."


Culminating in 1963: CIA case officer Rudy Enders delivered this eulogy at the memorial for Grayston Lynch: "After serving in (WW II and) Korea, he attended one of the original special operations classes, graduating alongside such warriors as...Lucein Conein, formerly a member of the French Foreign Legion, the OSS, the CIA and the DEA...It's no wonder Gray was selected by the CIA to be one of only two Americans to assist the brave Cuban Brigade at the Bay of Pigs...The Brigade was let down - betrayed - by the very people that sent them into battle, not only were the Cubans, but Gray himself and fellow officer Rip Robertson. After this horrific catastrophe, a flicker of hope emerged when Gray and Rip were again called upon to help spark a flame of resistance within Cuba. It was then that he recruited and trained an elite commando force (Comando Mambises/AMGLOSSY) where many of you served. It was during this period that case officers like me, Mickey Kappes, Bob Stevens and others had the privilege of working alongside Gray and the brave, freedom loving commando teams...(Gray and Rip) demonstrated leadership qualities that elevated them to 'role model' status for every subsequent agency paramilitary officer. When our government decided to shut down even this program, I can assure you we were as hearbroken as the wonderful men we served. It is a scar that will never disappear. It is why Gray dedicated his life to telling the truth concerning this covert agency program."


08/24/64. Dispatch from COS, JMWAVE to Deputy Chief, WH/SA: Page 25: ..."b. The following CIA staff employees were in contact with AMICE-27 and are therefore considered known to Volsky: Andrew K. Reuteman as Tad Brickham; Willard R. Nauman as Al Rodemeyer; Stanley R. Zamka as Dr. Manuel Mendez; Irving N. Peggins as Joe Webster; Hobart J. Vandeborn as Tom Mesard..."

Page 27 of 40: https://theoswaldcode.com/bernardo_de_torres.pdf

From Donald Freed's Death in Washington, p. 195: "Most crucial to the defense (of Michael Townley, the man who murdered Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffit of the Institute for Policy Studies with a car bomb) was Townley's admissions of his CIA status to a man named Armando Lopez Estrada...in 1978 Lopez stood trial in Miami charged with a number of firearms violations. At trial, Lopez was identified as a long-time CIA contract agent. ...During testimony, the agency was constrained to admit that Lopez was, as of 1976, still an employee of the agency. The man testifying was Grayston Lynch...pointing out that the weapons provided to the Brigade by the CIA in the early 1960s were not registered so they could not be traced."

Gavin McDonald • Bill Simpich

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