Pseudonym: Reuteman, Andrew
104-10172-10336; SUBJECT AND HIS FAMILY LEFT HELSINKI FOR GOOD 17 JULY 1956.
07/23/56, Dispatch from COS, Helsinki to Chief, WE: Subject: General - REDCAP/LCIMPROVE. Specific - Arthur J. Lohwater: "1. The Subject and his family left Helsinki for good on 17 July 1956. Lohwater had just returned from his second trip to the Soviet Union during the week of 9 - 13 July and was only in Helsinki for four or five days prior to leaving for the United States via Europe. At the Station's request, the Cultural Attaché, Dr. Ott, called Lohwater into his office and asked him a few simple questions, such as, how was his trip to the USSR, if he knew any Soviets in Helsinki, and if so, which ones. According to Dr. Ott, the Subject seemed quite anxious to answer all these questions and even offered to give fuller answers, if required. He added that he had taken many pictures while in the Soviet Union, some of which were of the Soviet officials he met in Moscow. 2. Since Lohwater had agreed to talk more at length with an American, Dr. Ott, as prearranged, told him that Mr. William Mansfield would get in touch with him over the weekend by phone and arrange to see him. Lohwater gave Ott the telephone number of his temporary residence, but the Station was unable to reach him because no one answered the phone. The days between 13 and 17 July were rather busy at the Station, since two KUBARK (CIA) case officers were here on TDY and required varying degrees of Station assistance. Both Andrew K. Reuteman and Harold K. Shands, the case officers in question, agreed to pose as William Mansfield and do the debriefing if they could find the time. Both, however, were quite busy and Lohwater could not be reached...Melvin H. Pendleton."
104-10298-10158: CABLE - MR. HAL HENDRIX ADVISED REUTEMAN THAT DURING LUNCHEON
10/29/62, Cable from JMWAVE to Director: "1. Mr. Hal Hendrix advised Reuteman that during luncheon session with AMBUD-1 on 29 Oct he learned GPFOCUS and advised AMBUD-1 within last ten days (exact date unknown) that ODYOKE (U.S. Government) would intervene militarily in Cuba, there was urgently in need to intervene, and Cubans would be used when military intervention by ODYOKE took place, view these statements AMBUD-1 very bitter re failure ODYOKE solve Cuban crisis. AMBUD-1 trying telephone GPFOCUS for appointment to clarify future ODYOKE posture re Cuba. AMBUD-1 claims if no clear decisive answer received re ODYOKE continuation policies which designed effect Cuban liberation then AMBUD-1 will resign from all political activities as he no longer able work within framework which imposed on him by ODYOKE. 2. AMBUD-1 also told Hendrix that Aragon rep WASH had met with Mr. Hurwitch circa 1315 hours 29 October in which Hurwitch assured Aragon ODYOKE policy continues be liberation Cuba. 3. Hendrix trying research story on inconsistencies in ODYOKE Cuban policies i.e. statements to AMBUD-1 re liberation Cuba versus guarantees to Soviets that ODYOKE will not intervene militarily if Soviets withdraw missiles from Cuba. 4. If above info used by HQs please protect fact that info obtained from Hendrix. This most important if we are to continue development of Hendrix as source. C/S Comment: *No record in cable secretariat as of 1945 29 Oct 62."
104-10237-10005: DISPATCH: TYPIC/KUWOLK/OPERATIONAL AMCLATTER/l; MONTHLY REPORT, JANUARY 1963
2/15/63 memo from Chief of Station, JMWAVE to Chief, SAS: "The much publicized office of the State Department to be established in this area has caused great expectation in the Cuban colony and several organizations are preparing to present it with extensive documentation. The office will present the opportunity for many individuals and groups who cannot travel to Washington to present their viewpoints and policies. The centralization in itself is indicative to the Cubans that a new US effort is projected, and this has had the effect of raising the morale of the exiles."
104-10312-10378: MEMO: TRACES ON PARTICIPANTS IN THE SOVIET DEFECTOR OPERATION
05/22/63, Memorandum for the record from Andrew K. Reuteman, COS, JMWAVE: "The following traces are available on the various participants in the Soviet defection operation who have been identified to date: a. Jay Sourwine - No trace. b. Nathaniel Wyle - No trace. c. John Martino - See 201 in Registry. d. Mrs. (FNU) Lapham - No trace. e. (FNU) Bayo - No trace."
06/13/63, Cable from JMWAVE to Director (Orig: DCOS/OPS Frederick J. Inghurst): Slugline RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE TILT: "1. Operation TILT completed with return of PBY to Miami 2030 hours local 12 June. Infiltration team consisting 10 Cubans did not return from mission to Cuba. Two Cubans were added to team at last minute. We feel KUBARKERS (CIAers) on vessels and PBY did excellent job and without their participation do not believe op could possibly have been launched. Mr. Pawley stated completely satisfied WAVE support. 2. Cadick got impression from discussions with team leaders that perhaps team did not really plan to come out. Team very interested in briefings on infiltration but showed little interest in briefings on exfiltration. Showed no interest in discussing possible pickup on shore if in trouble. Leader stated on departure that if team not back by 1800 hours 11 June no need look any longer. Team leader told Cadick that his first contact was in Sagua de Tanamo 20 degrees 35N 75 degrees 14'W. To reach this contact and return same night practically impossible. We now believe team had no intention exfiltrating unless forced to by Cuban security forces. 3. LIFE photographer took many pictures and has promised to produce them 18 June for Pawley too censor. Pawley also called Mr. George Hunt to advise him of their safe house and reiterate their agreement re publication of story and pictures. 4. Will forward after action reports when completed." Frederick J. Inghurst: Authenticating Officer. Andrew K. Reuteman: Releasing Officer.
104-10241-10144: CABLE: 23 JUNE REUTEMAN, ZAMKA AND RAYNOCK MET AMBIDDY-1 TO
06/26/63, Cable from JMWAVE to Director: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD: "1. 23 June Reuteman, Zamka and Raynock met AMBIDDY-1 to placate his impatience go ZRMETAL (Washington, D.C) and resolve problems incident to implementation AMWORLD. 2. Meeting highly satisfactory. AMBIDDY-1 accepted premise AMWORLD progressing satisfactory but concept complicated and requires ironing out details. Most AMBIDDY-1 questions relate to future uncertainty whether he will maintain some type organization WAVE area. This necessary for intel and commo purposes according AMBIDDY-1. Station officers told AMBIDDY-1 that he can present each of his problems case by case to AMWORLD officers and each will be resolved in accordance with overall concepts. 3. Remainder of meeting AMBIDDY-1 given guidance to prepare for pending ZRMETAL meeting. Told to prepare personnel lists with biog data and try to obtain some concept of pending AMWORLD logistical needs."
11/20/63, Cable from JMWAVE to Director: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC AMTRUNK: "1. In 19 Nov meeting between Andrew K. Reuteman, Peggins and AMICE-27, latter agreed devote his efforts to assisting in Station's Rebel Army radio program, with understanding that AMICE-14 to continue with clandestine ops and the two activities to be largely compartmented. 2. At end of meeting A-27 said that he had written letters to AMTRUNK-1 and AMCAPE-1 saying that Op Leonardo had terminated. Reuteman told A-27 from future security viewpoint this advantageous, and not to say anything further to these individuals. 3. A-27 turned over to Leon C. Fluteo 20 Nov although Station dubious that this solution durable, it now puts monkey on A-27's back and should ease any possible future termination."
104-10241-10094: CABLE: AMBIDDY/1 BRIEFINGS BY REUTEMAN AND ZAMKA ORIGINALLY
01/03/64, Cable from JMWAVE to Director: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD: REF WAVE 9399: "1. AMBIDDY/1 briefings by Reuteman and Zamka originally scheduled to start last week in Dec not held due AMBIDDY/1 absence from WAVE area. According to AMYUM/19 he and AMBIDDY/1 are to leave 3 Jan for Puerto Rico attend wedding of AMJAVA/4 and return WAVE area afternoon 5 Jan. 2. Station wishes to know if AMBIDDY/1 intends remain in WAVE area on return and does HQs want Station schedule meetings starting 6 Jan. Please advise."
104-10059-10225: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION RE LIST OF WH (LA) DIVISION CHIEFS FROM 1964 TO JUNE 1973
06/30/75, Memorandum for the record from Walter Elder, Review Staff to Chairman, CIA Task Force: REFERENCE: Review Staff Memorandum No. 75/1033, 30 June 1975: "1 January 1964 - 26 March 1964: Col. Joseph C. King. 27 March 1964 - 27 June 1965: Desmond Fitzgerald. 28 June 1965 - 2 April 1972: William V. Broe. 3 April 1972 - 30 June 1973: Andrew K. Reuteman (P). 1 July 1973 - 9 May 1975: David A. Philips. 10 May 1975 - Present: David C. Higby (P)."
Larry Hancock, Nexus: The CIA and Political Assassination (2011), p. 118
..."Nobody in the Agency talked about David Morales and nobody outside the Agency was even supposed to know that name. Of course, Morales was known to people like William Harvey and John Roselli through his operational support of the highly compartmentalized Castro assassination missions. He was known to his boss, Ted Shackley (who locally in Miami was known only by his own crypt, 'Andrew K. Reuteman' or alias Tad Brickham). Morales would have been known to Angleton, through his counter intelligence assignments and the formation of the AMOTs. But beyond that, he was truly a shadow warrior - with one exception..." - - - See also Brian Latell, Castro's Secrets (2012), p. 90: