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Pseudonym: Cadick, Irving

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Pseudonym used by William ("Rip") Robertson, head of paramilitary operations in Guatemala in 1954 and aide to JMWAVE ops chief David Morales.
See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000923959.pdf

"Irving Cadick, Project PBSUCCESS head of KUHOOK/Paramilitary Operations Staff activities since 11 December 1953. He will be stationed at and operate from LINCOLN."

Also see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section:

03/02/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: ..."E. KUHOOK (CIA Paramilitary Operations Staff): 1) Firming up SYNCARP/SKIMMER relationship to insure reliability of Calligeris. Ontrich will undertake this week. 2) Based on Ontrich preparations, Cadick is to examine staging sites, staging preparation, transport facilities, etc., to insure Calligeris capability implement logistics plans. Cadick trip to be completed approx 10 March. 3) SCRANTON trainees will graduate approx 25 May, according present plans. 4) Twenty-seven sabotage trainees will graduate 15 March. Leader trainees will graduate SARANAC approx 1 May allowing thirty days implement organization inside target area..."

More at https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=145047&relPageId=237

Also see 180-10145-10158: 04/11/78 - HSCA document - HSCA staffer Leslie Wizelman's review of CIA documents on Carlos Hernandez Sanchez identify "Irving Cadick" as "Rip".

Also see https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000921029.pdf - 6/28/54 from LINCOLN to SHERWOOD for "Cadick" "Destruction TGW transmitter...FYI, Guat attempting coup against Diaz..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 274. 7/8/54-Memorandum From William Robertson of Operation PBSUCCESS to the Chief of the Project

07/08/54, Department of State document, Subject: PM Operation: ..."II. Staging and Pre-Operation Preparations:..1. Approximately 85 Calligeris personnel had received training in Nicaragua, 75 of these under the guidance of Pivall. Pivall graduated 30 sabotage leaders, 6 shock troop leaders, 16 organizers, 4 staff personnel and 19 incompetents..." - - Page 426: ..."VI. Recommendations for all field personnel considered as having performed in an efficient manner are being presented in separate reports. I wish at this time, however, to place in the body of this report my personal opinion that the key man to the success of this project is Vincent C. Pivall (note: Probably Jack Stewart). Pivall's firm adherence to orders enabled Lincoln to rely on the fact that plans were being carried out within the realm of possibility and that Principal Agent attempts to alter these plans were minimized. The preservation of KUBARK (CIA) interests was considered a solemn duty by Pivall and it showed up the results of his work. His professional knowledge and direct manner of dealing with the indigenous personnel gained him, and CIA, their respect and spirit of camaraderie necessary to good guidance on operations of this type. In addition, Pivall's analytical and objective thinking and reporting, spotted for Lincoln many defects in the old Calligeris organization, useful in planning the operation. It is recommended that his services would be valuable in a KUHOOK (CIA Paramilitary Operations Staff) staff position within WHD if he is to remain in WHD. If released from WHD, it is recommended that KUHOOK staff consider him for training assignments or a field project assignment after completing a KUHOOK training course at (place not declassified). It would be a serious CIA/KUHOOK loss to lose this man through disinterest on the part of CIA or through allowing him to become de-motivated. (Signed) William Robertson, CPM/PBSUCCESS."

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume II: Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy Current Section: C. Rip Robertson's Excursion into Diplomacy

Circa 1960: "In his transmittal of Robertson's first reports, REDACTED reported as follows: 'CADICK (Robertson) is now operating completely outside of REDACTED, because REDACTED wants to know nothing more than what is absolutely required that he know regarding these activities, he has given CADICK the essential cryptonyms..."


2/8/61: Memo from N. Ingler, WH/4/PM, x 4575 at BELL to BELL Signal Center, JMZIP TAGBAR: "Please pass Operational Immediate to Barbara J #35: Advise Santiago and Humberto MRR people will receive and assist them. REDACTED. Rendezvous point for Palo will be altered. Will advise details following TROUT." - - - Also see Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume III: Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, 1959 - January 1961 Current Section: E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery at Santiago de Cuba, 13-14 March 1961. From JMRIMM to BELL, slugline JMZIP TAGBAR COMMO: "Re your message number 49. Cadick sends...TEACUP debarked 130045R March, sneaked past several...to Cayo Raton. Island covered with brush and trees...fired 200 rounds...cracking plant and causing bright explosion...TEACUP coolest seen by Cadick to date..."

104-10224-10000: LYNCH, GRAYSON L., OP.

01/16/62: Memo from Paul E. Eckel, Chief, Paramilitary Group, CA Staff to Chief, WH/4. Subject: Project ZRJEWEL Reports, William Robertson-Grayston Lynch: "1. Paragraph 9 of Reference requested that CA/C/PAG be kept informed of the standard of performance, and of the acquisition of additional capabilities by either training or experience, of Robertson and Lynch during the period of their assignment to WH Division. 2. As Robertson and Lynch now have been employed operationally by WH/4 for a period of six months, and as they are the first to have been engaged under the new ZRJEWEL program, it would be appreciated if we could have reports from Chief, WH/4 on these men at an early date. In addition to the date required on regular Fitness Reports, we are interested particularly in knowing from WH/4: a. How these men are being used, i.e., whether they are engaged in operations, training, planning, etc.; and the extent to which this has been exclusively in the field of PM activities. b. If engaged in agent operations, whether they are employed as singleton agents, principal agents, recruiters, etc. c. The degree and general location of their possible exposure to hazardous duty, if any. d. The degree to which they may have been compromised in terms of personal security, if at all, and the general location where this may have happened. e. Any new skills they may have acquired either by training or experience. 3. Also, since CA/PAG has ultimate responsibility for these ZRJEWEL personnel after their operational usefulness to WH Division has ended, it would be very helpful to us in planning the future conduct of the ZRJEWEL program if occasionally we could have a report directly from..these men personally, giving .. their own appraisal of their current utilization...we would appreciate your view as to whether this would be feasible, within bounds of operational security, and whether it .. best be accomplished by requesting written reports, or by oral de-briefings.."

104-10215-10099: ROSS L. CROZIER, 201-168881, VOL. V.

08/17/62: Dispatch from Chief, Task Force W to COS, JMWAVE: Subject: Information about Career Agents: "Transmitted herewith are sets of forms concerning the biographic data and request for assessment in the names of the three career agents stationed in JMWAVE, Irving C. Cadick, Irving C. Devuono and Harold R. Noemayr. Please have those reviewed for accuracy in the biographic section and have the appropriate supervisor complete the assessment portion. Stanley R. Zamka should prepare the assessment for Cadick and Devuono and Robert K. Trouchard should prepare the one for Noemayr. It is requested that these forms be returned to Headquarters as soon as possible."

104-10194-10009: CIA FILE ON CROZIER ROSS.

11/13/62: Memo from William K. Harvey, Chief, Task Force W to Chief, Contract Personnel Division: Subject: Application of Premium Pay for Certain Contract Personnel: "It is requested that the contracts for the following named Contract Employees and Career Agents be amended to include, in the applicable paragraph, the following provision: 'You are herein authorized Premium Pay in lieu of overtime in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization.' BLAINAUSE, Russell J.; DELLAROCCO, Peter V.; GLAVASCO, Philip D.; HEARD, Bruce R.; STUART, Jennifer A.; TARTARILLO, John K.; TARYDINA, Jacob C.; CADICK, Irving G.; NOEMAYR, Harold R.; DEVUONO, Irving G.; SLOMAN, Henry J.; LAURENKUS, Marvin A.; STARKROOD, Kenneth A."


06/13/63: Cable from JMWAVE to Director (Orig: DCOS/OPS, Frederick J. Inghurst): Slugline RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE TILT: "1. Operation Tilt completed with return of PBY to Miami 2030 HRS local 12 June. Infiltration team consisting 10 Cubans did not return. Two Cubans were added to team at last minute. We feel CIAers on vessels and PBY did excellent job and without their participation do not believe OP could possibly have been launched. Mr. Pawley stated completely satisfied WAVE support. 2. Cadick got impression from discussions with team leaders that perhaps team did not really plan to come out. Team very interested in briefings on infiltration but showed little interest in briefings on exfiltration. Showed no interest in discussing possible pickup on shore if in trouble. Leader stated on departure that if team not back by 1800 HRS 11 June no need to look any longer. Team leader told Cadick that his first contact was in Sagua de Tanamo 20 degrees 35N 75 degrees 14’W. To reach this contact and return same night practically impossible. We now believe team had no intention exfiltrating unless forced to by Cuban security forces. 3. LIFE photographer took many pictures and has promised to produce them 18 June for Pawley to censor. Pawley also called Mr. George Hurt to advise him of their save return and reiterate their agreement re publication of story and pictures. 4. Will forward after action reports when completed."


06/28/63: Cable from JMWAVE to Director: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE TILT: "1. When CRC made its invasion announcement 20 June WAVE initiated inquiries throughout exile community designed establish what exile PM types were missing from Miami or had temporarily dropped out of sight. It was believed acquisition this type info would facilitate cross-checking on size CRC sponsored invasion. Additionally view timing of TILT, i.e., infiltration 10 men north coast Oriente 9 June, we were concerned that Op TILT might be part CRC invasion force particularly since per para two ref it Cadick impression TILT team did not plan exfiltrate...4. Reviewing Op TILT in framework para 3 info tends clarify some aspects of TILT. Believe current info makes it evident TILT participants had no Soviet contacts but they parlayed notional Sov contacts into sharp con game designed attract Angel, i.e., QQDALE, LIFE, Sourwine, et. all who could facilitate their exit from U.S. as well as give them some arms equipment. Their con game worked because Soviet defector bait could not be passed up by Angels or CIA. While facts which currently available tend indicate con game worked and CIA invested circa 4000 dollars in con game... Additionally believe there are fringe benefits from Op TILT which have accrued to CIA's credit...These are: A. QDDALE has gained renewed confidence CIA ability handle PM infil ops...B. LIFE reps are now acutely aware difficulties inherent in clandestine PM ops against Cuba and are less likely knock intel agencies in future. C. Sourwine of Senate Internal Security Committee aware CIA will take offbeat risk on unorthodox op for worthy target. D. Ten well armed men have been put into Cuba. They should be short term irritant to Castro even if they rolled up in short order. E. Valuable experience was gained in coordinating vessel and PBY movements in Carribbean. This live training will serve WAVE well in mounting its unilateral ops..."


03/02/64: Dispatch from COS, JMWAVE to Chief, Special Affairs Staff: Page 3: ..."c. 21 September 1963: John Martino contacted Irving G. Cadick on 12 September 1963 in order to report that Martino received a letter from Victor Garcia who was employed at YOACRE. The Garcia letter was dated 28 August 1963 and it stated that Eduardo Perez, aka Bayo, and his men had recently caused the death of a number of militia men and some Russian officers in a fire-fight which took place at Mayari in Oriente Province. (Field Comment: JMWAVE has no information which would confirm such a fire-fight)... Martino asked Cadick if Cadick’s organization would infiltrate Castillo and his men if Martino determined that they were ready to go to Cuba to help Perez. Cadick told Martino that he doubted that he could obtain any help for the infiltration of additional people into Cuba..."


12/01/64: Cable from Lepoldville to Director: Slugline RYBAT CHAPPIE WIPEGASUS: "1. All members team will derive satisfaction if one then allowed remain LEOP look after Perez and accompany him U.S. Cadick and Station agree. 2. Ricardo Morales has volunteered for duty. Request authority retain him. Advise. 3. Morales is intelligent English-speaker who should cause no security problem. His minor wound all but healed. 4. Will retain his I-512 for U.S. reentry. *Perez earliest possible discharge 15 8 Dec."


"William Alexander Robertson, Jr: BIRTH: 3 Aug 1920, Muskogee County, Oklahoma, USA. DEATH: 1 Dec 1970 (aged 50), Dallas, Dallas County, Texas, USA. BURIAL: Culpeper National Cemetery, Culpeper, Culpeper County, Virginia, USA. PLOT: Plot: E173, bur. 12/04/1970 - - Moved 06/13/1977 to Arlington National Cemetery. MEMORIAL ID: 3004232 - View Source."


08/25/2010: Article by Rudy Enders: Titled: With the CIA in Vietnam: Page 8: ..."Chief of Station, Gordon (Gordy) Jorgenson, was one of them. Although I met him only briefly, his reputation and leadership drew the highest respect from the 'doer' crowd. He cut enough slack to allow new ideas and concepts to flourish. Others like Stu Methven, Harry Monk, Jack Shirley, Ralph Johnson , Rip Robertson, Tucker Gougelman, had been in Vietnam long before I arrived and were still there on extended tours to help counter the roughly 3,000 VC terrorist assassinations annually which included innocent school teachers, their families, government officials, land owners, and anyone outwardly opposed to Communism. These were officers on the front lines doing everything in their power to find some way to stop VC atrocities. Ideas don't come easy. Those in Saigon looked at various models. They solicited advice from men like Edward Landsdale, architect of the successful counter-insurgency against the Huckballihuck in the Philippines; George Fenner, and Robert Thompson, whose police programs eventually defeated the Communists in Malaysia; and many others with highly impressive background. Books could be written on every one of these individuals, and some were, but many never received adequate credit for their deeds and accomplishments and still remain anonymous..." https://www.air-america.org/files/documents/reviernam_1.pdf

Bill Simpich • MFF • Larry Hancock

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