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Cryptonym: WIFLAT-3

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Unknown identity. A cable from Leopoldville in March of 1961 stated that the pressures on WIROGUE (David Tzitzichvili) from WIFLAT-3, Kazadi and Pierrot were becoming greater all the time.
A cable in May, 1961, stated that WIROOT-2 was suspicious of Major Pierrot, who had been in opposition to WIFLAT-3. In terms of Pierrot and Kazadi, Major Paul Arnold Pierrot was Chief of the Congolese Air Force (CAF), in 1961 (although he was apparently removed from this position towards the end of that year), while Fernand Kazadi was the Commission General for National Defense in the Congo. An undated CIA memo on the death of Patrice Lumumba mentioned that Kazadi claimed to have been present during the latter's execution. Therefore, WIFLAT-3 was mixing in the same circles as the likes of David Tzitzichvili, Major Paul Pierrot and Fernand Kazadi.


Undated: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis: 44. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency: Titled: DEATH OF PATRICE LUMUMBA: "Though no single report is so definitive or complete that it can be accepted as an official version of Lumumba’s death, (2) there is sufficient information on hand that recurs through the welter of reporting on the subject to permit advancing the following: a. Patrice Lumumba, Maurice Mpolo, Minister of Sports and Youth in the Lumumba cabinet and Joseph Okito, former acting president of the Congolese Senate, were flown from Moanda to Elisabethville on January 17. Immediately prior to the flight they were moved by truck and small aircraft from their military prison quarters in Thysville to Moanda — a seaside resort town which does not have a UN garrison. From the delay in reception in Elisabethville it is apparent that Katanga authorities were not expecting this cargo at that particular time, though there were inconclusive conversations on the subject between Leopoldville and Elisabethville authorities in early January when fears developed that the Léopoldville authorities could no longer trust the Thysville garrison. b. All three prisoners died shortly after their arrival in Katanga. There are conflicting reports about how death was met and when, but the report of one of our most reliable Elisabethville sources that the trio were executed on January 17 within hours after arrival stands as the most credible. Confirmation is to be found in a report from a long-time Léopoldville asset directly quoting Fernand Kazadi, Commission General for National Defense, who claims to have been present at the execution. A further report tending to confirm the execution came to one of our staff agents in Léopoldville from Albert Kalonji’s representatives in Brazzaville on February 9..."

104-10182-10052: CIA FILE ON WIROGUE.

03/17/61: Cable from Leopoldville to Director: Slugline RYBAT WIROGUE: "1. Complete rundown pouched 17 Mar. WIROGUE now has attestation as advisor with rank of major to Congolese air force signed by Kazadi. Contract not yet signed. 2. WIROGUE asked by Pierrot if he would go Europe to hire instructors. WIROGUE willing but needs instructors set up for him. When asked time element WIROGUE said by end of month. 3. Pierrot also asked WIROGUE to create Congolese air intel arm. 4. Station believes use KUBARK (CIA) recruited instructors would provide excellent means inserting assets into armed forces and developing air force into highly trained and disciplined unit which could be used to support political forces friendly ODYOKE (U.S. Government). The so called air infantry unit of about 242 men which to be formed would provide strong force by local standards and could provide balance of power. Also, instructors would be in position gather intel throughout Congo, particularly if WIROGUE sets up air intel unit. 5. Urge HQs give careful consideration this ops possibility. Realize WIROGUE not best asset for this work but if Mr. Heckathorne not used Eliz, believe this would offer excellent opportunity insert him as school chief. Please advise HQs views soonest."

104-10182-10052: CIA FILE ON WIROGUE.

03/28/61: Cable from Leopoldville to Director: Slugline WIROGUE: REF LEOP 1069 (IN 25118): "1. WIROGUE informed by Peirrot 27 March CAF school will definitely begin 3 April. At same time asked if he could leave immediately for Europe to get instructors and again queried for names of people to whom he had written. Has still not obtained name of German colonel who is Congolese contact but CAF willing to bypass. 2. WIROGUE worried because thus far he has been all talk and no results. Pressures on WIROGUE from WIFLAT/3, Kazadi and Pierrot greater all the time. GOC (Government of Congo) claimed can get instructors here without passports. If some names supplied can stall but without any names situation for WIROGUE becoming very difficult. WIROGUE believes if project doesn't receive support immediately he will have to leave area. Station doubts problem quite this serious. 3. Advise action tacan soonest."

104-10182-10052: CIA FILE ON WIROGUE.

04/02/61: Cable from Leopoldville to Director: "1. In answer Ref A para 2 we prefer WIROGUE remain LEOP but he working for CAF and ordered Europe now given second task to contact German officers Col (FNU) Stahl (L) (see MUNI 5132) (IN 28066), Col (FNU) Stein and unidentified German general Munich. He to discuss arms for CAF including types and quantity available price, method and time of delivery though he not to actually make deal. To prevent leaving this matter UPHILL (BND), does HQs wish provide names other arms dealers. May be difficult keep WIROGUE LEOP if Kazadi and Pierrot determined he go Germany. 2. Request clarification Ref B. If Swanson not witting KUBARK (CIA) relationship this case what has he been told and what is story for original connection per previous traffic. One lever used by WIROGUE to become Pierrot adviser was story he had contacts to provide instructors. If Swanson establishes direct contact Pierrot this could easily undercut WIROGUE influence. 3. Wish urge if possible recruit at least one each mechanic and flying instructor prior to arrival LEOP. Fully appreciate time factor and desire pre-empt any effort on part Pierrot to procure instructors by other channels. If WIROGUE and Swanson settle on names there is possible time for HQs to check out prospective instructors and make recruitment pitch. Although Congolese have big ideas and hope need more instructors, this may not be case. If we rush in all non KUBARK assets we may find ourselves with expensive op over which we have little control and which might produce little for KUBARK..." The UPHILL cryptonym is mentioned on page 57 of this document: https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/second-release-lexicon.pdf

104-10182-10052: CIA FILE ON WIROGUE.

04/19/61: Field Information Report: Subject: Belgian Support of Congolese Air Force: "1. During a Congolese military staff meeting including Captain Babia, aide to General Mobutu, and Major Paul Arnold Pierrot, Chief of the Congolese Air Force (CAF), the question was raised who is paying for large shipment of car supplies. Babia confirmed that Lt. Col Marliere, Belgian advisor to Mobuto and former senior force publique officer, paid for the supplies on behalf of the Belgian Government. (Source Comment: Belgians are beginning supply everything to CAF without cost). (Field Comment: Quantity, type and price of material not known to source. Another contact (F) stated Belgians now bringing in equipment and personnel to help train CAF)..." WIROGUE (David Tzitzichvili) was the source for this report.

104-10182-10052: CIA FILE ON WIROGUE.

05/31/61: Cable from Leopoldville to Director: Slugline RYBAT WIROGUE: "On 28 May WILDCAT/5 requested name check for WIROGUE on behalf WIROOT. Apparent cause was application by WIROGUE for permanent residence card though Station not aware he applying until name check requested. WIROOT/2 suspicious Major Pierrot who has been in opposition WIFLAT/3. Thus WIROOT suspicious WIROGUE view his contacts with Pierrot. Station replying no traces. Depending on depth, check could cause difficulty for WIROGUE."

104-10182-10052: CIA FILE ON WIROGUE.

10/09/61: Cable from Leopoldville to Director: Slugline RYBAT WIROGUE UPHILL: "1. WIROGUE contacted Salvack 7 Oct. Said Congolese Air Force (CAF) chief Pierrot now permanently ousted. Also said Maliere told him CNA plans put European in charge CAF and considering three persons for position: Col Stahl, WIROGUE and Captain Peter de Groeve, who also CAF adviser. 2. WIROGUE asked PBPRIME (U.S.) reaction and interest in Stahl. Salvack said Stahl West German and PBPRIME willing see Stahl in position. Salvack denied any ODYOKE (U.S. Government) contact with Stahl other than through Aira. WIROGUE said he willing to support Stahl as long as Stahl did not try undermine his position. Added he thought he could get Stahl thrown out of Congo if ODYOKE so wished. Salvack told WIROGUE does not desire this and said such step might rebound against (REDACTION). 3. WIROGUE met Guthman on street outside TPELIDE 7 Oct. Leaving companion (whom Guthman believes to have been de Groeve) WIROGUE took Guthman aside and stressed that ODYOKE would have better control of CAF through him than through Stahl. Guthman sidestepped issue stressing ODYOKE had no interest undercutting West Germans or Stahl...4. WIROGUE visited Aira 9 Oct to discuss same subject. Aira denied any ODYOKE connection with Stahl but pointed out Stahl West German and pro-West. Therefore in ODYOKE interest to have Stahl named chief CAF if GOC (Government of Congo) favorable his nomination. 5. WIROGUE seems fear Stahl and considers Stahl threat to his position. (Stahl would be in good position check WIROGUE's cover story and expose him as imposter). LEOP and Aira have impression WIROGUE wants to oust Stahl if possible and wants PBPRIME backing for action. 6. Request any HQs guidance."

Gavin McDonald

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