Blond Ghost, by David Corn, p. 68
from the book: From the JMWAVE base, Miami station chief Shackley in the early 1960s supervised dozens of case officers and hundreds of agents plotting sabotage and espionage...
The Church Committee interviewed JMWAVE station chief Ted Shackley, primarily to ascertain what the station did in terms of utilizing anti-Castro Cuban contacts in investigating the Kennedy assassination.
David Morales' "cover review" for assignment to JMWAVE contains scribbled notes of some of his history, including PBSUCCESS (the Guatemalan coup) and assignment to Havana under State Dept. cover
The ARRB Final Report commented on cable traffic from the CIA station in Mexico City, noting that "the traffic contained numerous gaps, particularly in communications between Mexico City and the CIA station in Miami, JMWAVE."
The official CIA Bay of Pigs history noted that in 1960 CIA "expanded its Forward Operations Base named JMASH", later renaming it JMWAVE.
Despite heavy redactions, this JMWAVE org chart still shows that its departments included an Operations branch, and External Operations branch, a Technical Services section, and more, including a "Special Ops" section.
Bill Simpich's book has much on JMWAVE and some of its personnel including David Morales.
"The Miami Station (JMWAVE) was established in 1961 not 1960. Robert K. Davis served as COS from October 1961 to February 1962...Thomas Shackley served as COS from April 1962 to June 1965. John Dimmer served as COS from June 1965 to March 1967." Also see William Sturbitts' deposition, 178-10002-10279. Page 6 - Following Dimmer was Paul Henze until 1968, and then Jake Esterline from 1968-1973. p. 7, explaining that it answered in Langley to Task Force W formed (September 1961), it became Special Activities Staff and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group - at that point leadership returned to the WH Division. (p. 8): As to JMWAVE, it was formerly a small forward operations base in Coral Gables in 1960. Page 9: Cuban operations terminated gradually about 1972-1973.
REDACTED sometime in Dec of 1961, described to (Samuel) Halpern a meeting at the Director's office in which McCone had stated that Helms would henceforth "be his man on Cuba". REDACTED told Halpern that Helms had no inkling that he would be appointed head of the Cuban operations before this meeting. Sometime after the meeting Helms came to REDACTED office, checked into the organization of REDACTED operations and directed that Cuba would be a separate activity and no longer part of the WH Division." Source: Halpern, 6/18/75. Staff: Shea. 7/1/75.
8/25/62 cable WAVE 7598 from WAVE to Director: "...Key issue here is ability sell concept that Castro now preparing export his revolution into Caribbean backed by Sovs and only by creation NATO type alliance and action can this threat be neutralized. WAVE would prepare letters from alleged eye witness who would write about Soviet troop landings (in Cuba). Letters would be addressed select L.A. newspapers and inserted into international mail by KURIOT/Technical Services Division HQS so that recipients would believe mail originated from Cuba." Extensive marginalia.
4/19/63 dispatch from Chief, JMWAVE to Chief, SAS: "The information on the counterrevolutionary organization, Unidad Revolucionaria (UR), contained in the attachments to this dispatch represents the third in a series of studies...JMWAVE is currently engaged in similar studies on the DRE, MRP and RDR (Rescate).,,the completion (of these studies) will represent the end of the first phase of the counter-revolutionary studies project at JMWAVE; the objective of compiling background, biographic, and operational support data on the seven major opposition groups will have been achieved." (Besides these five groups mentioned, the other two groups can probably be deduced by process of elimination.)
Jesus Arboleya, The Cuban Counterrevolutionaries (Ohio University, 2000), p. 120
"The Navy created by the CIA was comprised of six 'mother ships' - entrusted with transporting the groups as near as possible to Cuban shores - and 122 smaller craft that could operate in conjunction with or independently of the mother ships...the sea route thus became the principal means for carrying out sabotage and attacks against the Cuban coastline...JMWAVE formed some fifty-five companies in Florida, which encompassed activities as diverse as fishing, arms sales, private investigation, stores and real estate...A number of radio stations were purchased, and area newspapers willingly submitted to censure and were manipulated for the purposes of disinformation and propaganda."