03/27/53: Cable from Sr. Rep. Vienna to Director: Slugline INTEL/REDCAP: SUBJECT: GRALLSPICE-1: FOR: (REDACTION): "1. SALZ reports re initial period contact with subject indicate despite previous briefing present case officer supervision subject persists in actions which could easily bring subject attention U.S. security organizations and enemy agents SALZ area. Specifically subject has made unauthorized contact with Sov émigré SALZ and his night life SALZ cafes appears likely result in incident. 2. Although SALZ making every effort control subject feel situation will not improve as long as subject in Europe. Ops use subject in SALZ area necessarily limited by subject security situation vis a vis previous work VIEN. 3. Above does not detract from fact subject willing work and qualified for employment as KUBARK (CIA) agent. Assessments by (REDACTION) and DOB REP confirm subject potential value to KUBARK. 4. Inquiries American Consulate MUNI indicate subject U.S. visa application will not be processed for minimum period 6 months. Suggest DIR may wish consider arrange subject admission to U.S. and residence under KUBARK sponsorship pending normal issuance subject visa and immigration processing. Basis info currently available Austria, not able judge feasibility such action. Advise."
12/14/53: Dispatch from Chief of Base, Salzburg to Chief, EE: FOR: Chief, SR (Attn: REDACTION): Subject: General - Operational/REDSOX/AEACRE. Specific - GRALLSPICE-1 Progress Report for November 1953: ..."6. Previously (EASA-2445 c (2) SOB had requested additional documentation for GRALLSPICE-1 from MKTOPAZ (CIA Technical Services Division), Frankfurt. The pictures which had been sent before with that request were unacceptable and new pictures were forwarded in EASA-2575. It is hoped that this additional documentation will be soon forthcoming."
John Newman, Oswald and the CIA, pp. 87-88.
While in Berlin, Popov passed this U-2 leak to the Agency and then returned to Moscow.
00/03/96: Oswald and the Hunt for Popov's Mole: Page 14: ..."William Hood, who signed off on the post-assassination letter addressed to Langelle, was a long-time counterintelligence ally of Angleton's, even though he was assigned in 1963 to the post of Western Hemisphere Division Chief of Operations. He took a special interest in the Popov case, and wrote a book about it, Mole, for he had been Vienna Chief of Station when Popov was originally recruited there..."
ARRB document: Research and Analysis: Acronyms/Abbreviations/Crypts/Organizations Identification Aid: Page 22: ..."GRALLSPICE: Crypt for Lt. Col. Petr Popov (CIA)..."
1999: Studies in Intelligence Article by Kevin C. Ruffner: Titled: Trying to Warm Up the Cold War: A Futile Fling With Sexspionage in Austria (S): Page 3 (PDF): ..."GRALLSPICE: In January 1952, Headquarters approved Vienna Operations Base's proposal to use Shebalin in its REDCAP (operational exploitation of Soviet personnel) program and gave him the new operational cryptonym of GRALLSPICE (20) The Agency backstopped Shebalin as a German national working in Vienna as a representative of a German firm purchasing surplus US Army materiel for resale in Germany. This cover allowed Shebalin to work with local black-marketers in some minor money-changing deals and to move freely about the city. (21)..." - - - Page 6: ..."After three meetings, George Kisevalter, a CIA staff officer and Russian speaker, took over from Shebalin. In time, it became clear that Maj. (later lieutenant colonel) Pyotr Semvonovich Popov, a GRU officer stationed in Vienna, would become one of the CIA's greatest spies. As a CIA agent from 1953 until his death in 1960, Popov, a REDCAP recruitment, provided a wealth of information on Soviet military and intelligence organs and their world-wide operations. (40)..."
State Secret Wiretapping in Mexico City, Double Agents, and the Framing of Lee Oswald by Bill Simpich: ..."After the CIA’s top double agent was captured by the Soviets, Jim Angleton obsessively looked for a mole while Bill Harvey blamed himself: Besides Oswald’s value in shaking up the Russians because he looked so much like Webster, there was another game afoot. While Oswald was a radar operator in Asia, Col. Pyotr Popov was a top double agent for the CIA, providing important Soviet military intelligence to Angleton under the code name ATTIC. In April, 1958, Popov heard a drunken colonel brag about the 'technical details' that the KGB had on a new high-altitude spycraft that America was flying over the USSR. Popov concluded that the leak of such details came from within the U-2 project itself. While in Berlin, Popov passed this U-2 leak to the Agency and then returned to Moscow.  During 1958-1959, Berlin chief Bill Harvey was very worried that Popov had been found out and was going to be arrested due to heavy-handed FBI surveillance. During a visit to New York City, a Soviet spy partner of Popov’s had noticed that someone had rifled through her bags. Harvey’s response was, 'Oh shit, oh damn.' The quality of Popov’s reports decreased during the summer of 1959, always a troubling sign that the source has been discovered by the other side.  Many who have reviewed this case conclude that CIA counterintelligence officers wanted to use Oswald’s defection as an opportunity to listen to what the Soviets thought about Oswald’s background as a radar operator for the U-2. But maybe there was more at stake. Perhaps they wanted to see whether the Soviets thought that Oswald might be useful as a possible way to draw out Popov. Or maybe the idea was to dangle Oswald as bait to draw out the mole that had exposed Popov." (CONTINUED BELOW)
"On the day Oswald arrived in Moscow, Popov and a key CIA officer were arrested in Moscow. Popov was executed. Oswald's arrival was on the same date as Popov's arrest. Although Oswald's Moscow arrival was sped up as part of the ongoing drama involving Webster, it may have been part of a hunt for the person in U.S. intelligence who had exposed 'Popov’s mole.' In any case, Popov’s capture had to throw Angleton – a notoriously paranoid man - for a loop. Angleton's biographer Tom Mangold wrote that the execution of Popov accelerated Angleton's belief that 'Popov could only have been betrayed by a mole buried deep within Soviet Division.' Mangold found Angleton misguided, stating that the evidence is clear that a CIA officer gave the game away for good when he was spotted picking up a message from Popov. 'Popov was actually lost to the Soviets because of a slipshod CIA operation; there was no treachery.'  The important thing, as brought out by author David Robarge, is that Popov's capture marked the time when Angleton became 'fixed on the mole'. Angleton wanted to know who was the mole who had exposed Popov. Angleton’s predecessor as CI chief, Bill Harvey, had returned to his command fortress at Staff D in late 1959. Harvey listened to wiretaps from around the world, including the heavily wiretapped Soviet embassies, in a specialized office with armed guards. Harvey blamed himself for Popov’s capture. He knew that the proper security protocol had not been used when Popov’s message was picked up.  He was much more comfortable in the field than Angleton would ever be..."